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Being Together: Dietrich BonhoefFer
on Human Being
and Theological Ethics i
Darren E. Dahl
Graduate Student, Lutheran School of Theology
at Chicago
Is it meaningful to speak about existence as ethical at all?
If it is, how does one speak of a Christian ethic? This article
proposes to offer a theological understanding of human being
and doing in order to create a space for theological ethical re-
flection, discourse and action. Throughout his life as a scholar
and pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer wrestled with the question of a
Christian ethic and its relation to the life of the church. In our
contemporary milieu of individualism the question of articulat-
ing an ethic within the framework of our theological tradition
j
is both challenging and important. It is challenging because
:
the image of an autonomous, independent, self-creating human
; being does not immediately suggest a life lived in responsible
' relationships with others. It is important because reflection
i
upon our life together reveals a profound connection among
I
humans and with all creation.
I Bonhoeffer begins his discourse on ethics from within the
;
experience of a breakdown of existing possible alternatives:
I
“One may ask whether there have ever before in human his-
;
tory been people with so little ground under their feet
—
people
I
to whom every available alternative seemed equally intolera-
i ble, repugnant, and futile.” ^ Bonhoeffer refers to what he calls
I
the “rusty swords”,^ the ethical alternatives of the past. They
1
are reason, fanaticism, conscience, duty, absolute freedom and
private virtuousness. ^ In articulating a specifically theological
ethic Bonhoeffer addresses the hidden assumption behind each
of these repugnant alternatives. In other words, to open up
a new space for ethical reflection in the place of these futile
options of the past he must begin with a theological analy-
sis of human being and doing. Through such an investigation
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both the problematic of the old alternatives as well as a new
approach can be investigated.
Theological reflection on human being engages in a polemic
against the Enlightenment understanding of the human as au-
tonomous. Human autonomy means that human beings as
selves understand themselves to be the source of their own ex-
istence. This notion of autonomy also suggests a self-enclosed
individual who is independent of the world and the “others”
who coexist in that world. Autonomy carries with it a certain
notion of freedom. Freedom is an innate quality of human being
and, therefore, is the basis of the human as a self-determined
volitional being. Autonomous freedom means that humans are
the source of their own possibilities. Given this notion of au-
tonomy, human identity is constructed through the subject’s
concretized possibilities—his or her actions. Who one is is
disclosed through the manner in which one concretizes one’s
freedom. Human autonomy understands “being” to be deriva-
tive of doing. My being is achieved through my doing. This is
what it means to be self-constituted. Consequently, theological
reflection on human being has to address the themes of self as
its own source, the relation of this self to the various “others”
with whom it lives, and the relation between being and doing.
To show the key issues regarding the understanding of hu-
man being as autonomous Bonhoeffer turns to the transcen-
dental philosophy of Immanuel Kant. For Kant reality is un-
derstood in terms of two spheres: the phenomenal and the
noumenal. The following quotation from The Critique of Prac-
tical Reason expresses this understanding and its relation to
human being:
A rational being, as belonging to the sensuous world [i.e., the phe-
nomenal world], recognizes itself to be, like all other efficient causes,
necessarily subject to the laws of causality, while in practical mat-
ters, in its other aspect as a being in itself, it is conscious of its
existence as determinable in an intelligible order of things [i.e., the
noumenal world]. It is conscious of this not by virtue of a partic-
ular intuition of itself but because of certain dynamic laws which
determine its causality in the world of sense, for it has been suffi-
ciently proved. . .that if freedom is attributed to us, it transfers us
into an intelligible order of things. . .[This] supersensuous nature of
[human beings] . . .is their existence according to laws which are in-
dependent of all empirical conditions and which therefore belong to
the autonomy of pure reason.^
Bonhoeffer 75
Kant’s two-fold understanding of reality is the result of his
conviction that reality is best understood in terms of causality,
i
Yet, given this starting point, he runs into a problem: strict
! causality leaves no room for human freedom. In order that hu-
I
mans do not simply become the pawns of nature and her laws,
Kant develops an understanding of freedom and reason that
locates the self in an intelligible (but not directly knowable) su-
persensuous nature. Time, as a form of phenomenal intuition,
does not exist within the noumenal realm. The self within the
noumenal realm is a-temporal—and therefore free—because it
^ is outside of the causally conditioned phenomenal world. Free-
dom is a transcendental quality of the noumenal self. The self
I
in the noumenal realm is related to the transcendental through
the “moral law” . This “moral law” is the legislative form that
reason achieves when an individual maxim is given universal
significance. Kant explains, “[A] rational being either cannot
think of his subjectively practical principles (maxims) as at the
same time universal laws, or he must suppose that their mere
form, through which they are fitted for being given as universal
laws, is alone that which makes them a practical law.”^ The
self is free because it is not conditioned by causality. Therefore,
it “can” do what the moral law prescribes that it “ought” to
do.*^ Its response to this moral law is one of “duty”.^ In consid-
ering this it is important to remember that this transcendental
always lies behind cognition and cannot be objectively known.
It can only be assumed as the condition for the possibility of
reason as either pure reason (what Kant understands as spec-
ulative reason)^ or practical reason (knowledge of the moral
law).
To get to the heart of the Kantian understanding of hu-
man being and doing one must consider the precise nature of
the “transcendental”. Bonhoeffer asks, “[W]hat in fact is this
‘transcendental’ to which everything is supposed to refer? If
it can never be objectively knowable, how can reason deter-
mine its own limits against this unknown? Even if it is to
exercise a free decision of practical reason, the outcome is nev-
ertheless reason’s self-chosen limitation, whereby it reinstates
its own authority—as the reason which performed this very
limitation.” 11 Thus, in the realm of moral action, if one is in
duty obligated to the moral law which one creates by one’s own
power, then one is not obligated to any but the self. The I is its
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own law-giver and its own judge. If Bonhoeffer is correct, and
the transcendental
—
particularly the moral law—is only a cover
for the elevated reason of human beings, the result for transcen-
dental philosophy is the human as ultimate reality. Bonhoeffer
continues by asking what it means that the I, who is to under-
stand itself from within itself, can in fact do so. He suggests
that to understand entails creativity. Thus, for the self to un-
derstand itself from within itself it has to have created itself in
its understanding. 12 According to Bonhoeffer, this idea is ex-
actly what ends up being asserted as transcendental philosophy
slips toward idealism. By drawing out Kant’s thought to its
extreme conclusion, idealism asserts that “Without I there is
no being; I is creative, the sole efficient; I goes out from itself,
and to itself returns. . .[I]dealism pronounces: the world is in
being through me.” 1^ Bonhoeffer concludes, “Thus the essence
of the person is freedom, autonomy, coming-to-itself or being-
by-itself.” 14 The picture that Kant and the Idealists paint of
human being is one of individual autonomous freedom. The
contingency of temporality cannot intrude upon my noumenal
being, the claims of the “other” are of no importance in a world
that has come into being through my understanding, and my
|
destiny lies unrestricted ahead of me in my freedom. As an au-
;
tonomous self, the I of transcendental and idealist philosophy '
is left alone in a timeless world that, through its own reason,
|
it has created.
i
In order to suggest an alternative view of human being
|
Bonhoeffer turns to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger. By
|
examining Heidegger’s understanding of Dasein as “being-in-
j
the-world” Bonhoeffer raises the issue of temporality and the
|
relation of the self to its world. Later, by looking at Bonho- I
offer’s and Heidegger’s understanding of death, the ultimate 1
limit upon human existence will be considered and a specifi-
|
cally theological articulation of human being will be offered.
|!
In order to counter Kant’s noumenal a-temporality Bon-
j
ho offer turns to Heidegger for whom “Being is essentially in- I
terpreted in terms of temporality.” Human being is always
j
already in a world and therefore in time. Bonhoeffer argues l|
that “we are set objectively in a definite nexus of experiences,
|
responsibilities and decisions from which we cannot free our-
||
selves again except by abstraction. We live, in fact, within this
j
nexus, whether or not we are in every respect aware of it.”l^
j|
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The self understood as being outside of the world is a pure
abstraction. As beings in the world we experience existence
as having a temporal character. That is, we experience past,
present and future as having a constitutive role in our being
human. As we reflect upon our own experience we do not find
ourselves to be timeless. On the contrary, we experience exis-
tence as being between the past and the future. The past is
experienced as the “no-longer” and is reflected upon through
memory. The future (adventum) is experienced as the “not-
yet” that breaks into our existence with the force of negation.
This temporality can be more concretely understood in its re-
lationship to social existence and the understanding of death.
Given the fact that we no longer understand human being
as being alone in a timeless world, the social nature of hu-
man existence can be addressed. Because it is in the world,
responsibility—human being as response-able^^—is always a
temporal experience. Bonhoeffer states that, “At the moment
when he is addressed the person is responsible, or, in other
words, faced with a decision.. .[and therefore he enters] into the
reality of time by relating [his] concrete person in time in all its
particularities to this obligation, by making [himself] morally
responsible.”!^ Humans experience temporality through their
social life in the world. The contingency of the future is ex-
perienced in the “unexpected” claim of the “other” whom I
meet in time. The situation itself where I and Thou meet is
a product of the past becoming present. Through the notion
of temporal sociality another approach to ethical responsibil-
ity is being formed that is very different from Kant’s notion
of duty. The I is not obligated to itself in its abstract, time-
less reason. Rather it is obligated to the “other” who makes
a claim upon it in time. Or, in other words, from Kant’s sys-
tem “...it followed, as the necessary consequence of a one-sided
epistemological philosophy, that the reasoning person had com-
mand of his own ethical value, entered by his own strength into
the ethical sphere, and bore his ethical motives within himself,
as a person equipped with mind. The real barrier was not
acknowledged.”!^ This “real barrier” is the other whose claim
upon the self in sociality calls the self out of itself and into the
world of responsibility. Bonhoeffer continues, “. . .the individual
cannot be spoken of without the ‘other’ also being thought who
has set the individual in the ethical sphere.” 20 Human being
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as “being-in-the-world” is called out of itself by its relation to
the “others” who also are in the world. “Sociality” character-
izes our existence. Bonhoeffer considers human being from this
social perspective and by examining the activities of thinking,
self-conscious willing and feeling he concludes that “...man’s
entire spirituality is interwoven with sociality, and rests upon
the basic relation of I and Thou. ‘Man’s whole spirituality
becomes evident only along with others: the essence of spirit
is that the self is through being in the other.’ ”21 Human be-
ing cannot be understood outside of its relation to others in
its world. Thus, Kant’s lonely noumenal self is shown to be
an abstraction that does not adequately account for the way
humans experience reality.
Until this point Bonhoeffer has argued that human being
is temporal and human being is in the relationship of social-
ity. The Enlightenment understanding of human being as a-
temporal and fundamentally alone has been sufficiently chal-
lenged. Along with this new understanding of human being as
“being-in-the-world” comes a new understanding of freedom.
Freedom will have to be freedom in relation. This will be dis-
cussed in the final section. So, while Bonhoeffer has appropri-
ated much of Heidegger’s philosophy to suggest this different
proposal he does not accept Heidegger’s thought without crit-
icism. His criticism particularly centers on Heidegger’s under-
standing of death.
The Kantian and idealist understanding of human being
has within itself glimpses of infinitude because of the I’s role
as self-creator, law giver and self-judge, but this understand-
ing is avoided in Bonhoeffer’s use of Heidegger. Dasein is al-
ways already in a world that it did not create. It participates
in this world as a finite, temporal being who, while always
being understood as potentiality, can never be absolute po-
tential because existence is always historical finite existence. 22
Bonhoeffer takes issue with Heidegger, however, precisely in
his understanding of finitude. He writes that for Heidegger
“the philosophical concept of finitude is that of incapsulated
finitude”. 23 This accusation becomes clear as one examines
Heidegger’s understanding of death. Both agree that human
being, as temporal, experiences the future as that which is
“not yet”. Bonhoeffer states, in his introduction to Creation
and Fall, that the church “lives from the end, it thinks from
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the end, it acts from the end, [and] it proclaims its message
from the end.” 24 Heidegger writes, “The ‘ahead-of-itself,’ as an
item in the structure of care, tells us unambiguously that in
Dasein there is always something still outstanding
^
which, as
a potentiality-for-Being for Dasein itself, has not yet become
‘actual’. It is essential to the basic constitution of Dasein that
there is constantly something still to be settled. However,
Bonhoeffer and Heidegger differ in the way they understand
the experience of death as the final “not yet” of the future.
The problem begins when Heidegger states that “Any Dasein
exists in just such a manner that its ‘not yet’ belongs to it.” 26
The future as “not yet” introduces contingency through nega-
tion. Yet, if the “not yet” belongs to existence—that is, does
not confront it from outside of itself—that contingency has al-
ways already been overcome by the enclosed Being of Dasein.
Death is that final “not yet” that is “impending” in that it
“stands before us”. 27 However, because even this “not yet”
belongs to the becoming28 nature of Dasein, death is under-
stood as a possibility. 29 Dasein, as a “being-towards-death”
,
experiences death as that which discloses Dasein’s utmost pos-
sibility: anticipation of death as a way of seeing Dasein as a
whole. Bonhoeffer summarizes Heidegger’s position:
As temporal Dasein within historicity (Geschichtlichkeit), it must
order itself upon its own final end, in order to attain its original
wholeness. And this end is death. In the most proper sense Dasein
is “being-towards-death”. . .[and] in the call of conscience it under-
stands that it is guilty in its gravitation to the world, its futility,
and enters into the possibility most proper to it—commitment to
death.69
Bonhoeffer and Heidegger share a common beginning in
their understanding of death. Dasein, as temporal, experiences
the future and, therefore, experiences the “not yet” of existence
as that which stands before it. For both thinkers death is dis-
closive. However, death discloses something different for each.
Because Heidegger works out of what Bonhoeffer calls an “in-
capsulated finitude” death can only disclose possibilities that
lie within existence as it is experienced between “birth and
death” .61 That is, because death is the final “not yet” which
nevertheless belongs to the ontological-existential structure of
existence, the possibilities it can disclose do not go beyond the
limits of the existence of Dasein—i.e., birth and death. For
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Bonhoeffer, however, death is disclosive of something else. He
writes, “The Christian account [of death] is very different: in
death to which man has forfeited himself, and into which he
has always lapsed, existence finds its real end, its terminus, not
its wholeness, completion, perfection; here ‘end’ qua finish and
‘end’ qua fulfillment are identifiable only in the metaphysical
system. Death is eternal death.” ^2 por Bonhoeffer death lies
outside of the structure of human being. It is the final “not
yet”
,
the contingency of all contingency, the negation at the end
of all negations. Death is the abyss, it is oblivion. This expe-
rience of death, precisely because it is experienced as coming
from outside of us, is experienced as the self in judgment: “[I]n
death, man must stand before the judgment-seat of Christ—II
Cor. 5, 10.” Because death is experienced as the final end
which meets the self from outside of itself, the possibility it
discloses is experienced as the self is put into question. It is
important to note that both Heidegger and Bonhoeffer make
use of the Augustinian phrase: “I have become a question to
myself.” However, because the “not yet” in Heidegger’s phi-
losophy already belongs to the existence of Dasein so, finally,
does the answer to the question that the self becomes. Bon-
hoeffer, in his Inaugural Lecture of 1930, writes, “Heidegger
certainly fully understands the man questioning himself to be
the basic problem, but in the end, in his writings also, the
question becomes the answer, man in fact has knowledge of
himself, the question has no ultimate seriousness.” ^5 However,
for Bonhoeffer, because the self meets a finality which in no
way belongs to it, the question is experienced differently. In
Heidegger’s thought the anticipation of death throws one back
upon existence and the possibilities inherent within it. For
Bonhoeffer the anticipation of death throws the self back be-
fore existence and the question of existence becomes one of the
self’s source. Because the self anticipates the creator as judge
in death it is thrown back upon the question of this creator as
the source of its being. Or, in other words, once the self finds
itself not to be its own creator and judge through the realiza-
tion that death is beyond its control—that death is something
|
totally outside of itself—the self asks the question of its rela-
|
tionship to the creator, source and judge of its existence. The !
self is disclosed as having a primordial source from whence it i
came. I
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Given the self’s confrontation with death and with its cre-
ator, autonomy comes to be understood in a new light. Auton-
omy is the creature of God trying to be independent of God.
It is the self’s attempt at its own Godhood. Bonhoeffer states,
“As the image of God man draws his life entirely from his origin
in God, but the man who has become like God has forgotten
how he was at his origin and has made himself his own creator
and judge.” In the above analysis of human autonomy it has
been suggested that the human individual understood as a self-
constituting source of its own existence is the ultimate reality.
If the I is creator of itself and its world through reason, its
identity—its answer to the question: “Who are you?”—must
come from within itself. Its “being” is established and created
through its doing. The action of the autonomous self will al-
ways already be an attempt to create its own identity. This
is so because in the illusion that I am the ultimate reality my
doing will attempt to disclose the unity of my being. Death, as
the final limit upon my self-determined doing, will continually
show my action to be futile. Because my “doing” cannot point
to a source that lies both before and after the contingency of
existence the question of my identity in “doing” will always be
fragmented. Bonhoeffer suggests that the I’s choice between
good and evil is precisely the disclosure of this fragmentation,
this disunity. He writes,
[A]heady in the possibility of the knowledge of good and evil Chris-
tian ethics discerns a falling away from the origin. . .The knowl-
edge of good and evil shows that he is no longer at one with this
origin. . .[because]. . .in the knowledge of good and evil man does not
understand himself in the reality of the destiny appointed in his
origin [i.e., his source before and after existence], hut rather in his
own possibilities, his possibility of being good or evil.^'^
Bonhoeffer continues, “Man knows good and evil, against
God, against his origin, godlessly and of his own choice, un-
derstanding himself according to his own contrary possibilities;
and he is cut off from the unifying reconciling life in God, and
is delivered over to death.” Thus, human life is in disunion.
What began as autonomy has come to be understood as sin,
or as Bonhoeffer often calls it, “being-in-Adam”.
The experience of this disunity is shame. “Shame is man’s
ineffaceable recollection of his estrangement from the origin;
it is grief for this estrangement, and the powerless longing to
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return to unity with the origin.” ^0 As the “futural” subject
projects itself towards the nullity of death and is thrown back
upon its creator “it is the memory of the disunion from the
Creator, and of the robbery from the Creator”, which is dis-
closed in shame. 41 From the experience of shame comes the
necessity of conscience. Conscience . .is the voice of the apos-
tate life which desires to at least remain one with itself.” 42 The
self in shame sets up God as the voice of conscience as an at-
tempt to recover the origin that has been lost. I believe that
by establishing a right relationship to myself I can establish a
right relationship to God. The essence of conscience is that I
become my own judge because I still assume that I have the
freedom to make the right choices. I believe that by standing
in judgment between my own possibilities of good and evil I
can choose the good and thus gather myself back together and
return to my origin. I remain my own judge and the creator
of my own possibilities—even the possibility of being restored
to my origin. The Old Adam, the autonomous self, still has
control over self. However, by maintaining this control the self
exists forever in the conflict of its conscience between good
and evil. As judge and creator of my existence I stand alone in
judgment of myself. In other words, as one in shame employing
conscience I believe that each and every word and deed—each
choice between good and evil—that comes from within me will
create the totality of who I am. Therefore, as my own judge
my action and speech are paralyzed. As I bear the “Atlas-
burden” of judgment I cannot purposefully act because each
moment of my existence is plagued by an overwhelming inde-
cisiveness as I stand between an infinite variety of possibilities.
In “exalting himself to be his own final judge”
,
writes Bonho-
effer, the autonomous self “proceeds to his own indictment” .43
Conscience tells me that I must restore myself to unity with
my source. I can do this through my active choice of good and
evil. However, because I know that my existence depends on
each decision I am driven to fear my own actions. Therefore,
my decision is always not to decide. Thus, my “action” be-
comes an action that is no action at ail. I actively decide not
to act. In my concern always to chose the good my attention
is focused on myself and my choices. Once again I am turned
back into myself (Luther) and therefore removed from life in
sociality.
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At this point two conclusions can be reached and the en-
suing problematic can be noted. First, the understanding of
human autonomy was sufficiently challenged by an appeal to
the experience of the self in community. That is, it was asserted
that reality is experienced socially and that to be at all is al-
ways to be already in a world of sociality. Thus, our “doing” is
always already within a world. While it “creates” in the sense
that others experience my action as an “unexpected” possibil-
ity, it does not constitute the world. My doing is always deriva-
tive of “being-in-the-world” . Secondly, the understanding of
human autonomy was sufficiently challenged by reflecting upon
the human experience of death and disunity with its source. By
showing that our “being-in-disunity” precedes our doing it can
be stated that while our “doing” is always disclosive of our
being—it does not constitute it. Two relationships, and their
resultant temporalizing of existence through the “other” and
through death, stand as evidence against human autonomy.
Also, through sociality and death the relation of “doing” and
“being” has been explored. “Being-in-the-world” and “being-
in-disunity” have been shown always to precede “doing”
.
Now that we have re-opened a space for ethical reflection
by suggesting an alternative to human autonomy another prob-
lem presents itself. Human being as “being-in-the-world” calls
one’s attention to the (horizontal) relationship with the world.
Human being as being-in-disunity-with-its-source calls one’s
attention to the (vertical) relationship with God. This presents
a challenge to ethical reflection. We began by asking whether
ethical reflection was possible given the understanding of hu-
man being as autonomous. Through an examination of that
autonomy it was concluded that it would be unnecessary for
the human being as an autonomous being to enter into ethical
reflection. This is so because ethical reflection is only necessary
and meaningful if the “other” makes some sort of a claim upon
our existence. Thus ethical life has to do with the relations be-
tween the self and the various “others” 44 that it experiences in
its world. The challenge to human autonomy through social-
ity certainly opens up a space for ethical reflection. However,
it does not advance the case for a specifically theological ethi-
cal reflection. The challenge to human autonomy through an
understanding of human as disunited with its source seems to
leave the human in only a vertical relationship with God.45
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This leaves us with the question: Can Christian ethics be pos-
sible at all? Or, in other words, can a theological interpretation
of being mediate between the human as “being-in-the-world”
and as “being-in-disunity”?
Bonhoeffer answers this question by suggesting that all
ontological discourse must be carried on within the specifi-
cally theological categories of “being-in-Adam” and “being-in-
Christ” He writes, “The reality of sin. . .places the individual
in the utmost loneliness, in a state of radical separation from
God and man.” 47 Therefore, because disunion with the source
of our existence is also disunion with the “others” I experience
in the world, ethical reflection must take sin into account. This
has already been suggested in the above analysis. It was stated
that the human in disunity is captured by its own conscience
and turned in upon itself to consider its own possibility of be-
ing good. The “being-in-Adam”
,
in shameful disunity, employs
conscience and in so doing turns in upon its own possibilities
in search of the right action that will reunite it with the source
of its existence. Only through the eyes of one who is in Adam
are the world and God separated. Ironically, it is freedom—the
hallmark of the autonomous self—that is the reason for this.
Freedom as an innate quality of human being allows the self to
choose between good and evil and in so doing leaves the self
in paralysis. This is so because every choice is always already
in bondage to that choice. The autonomous sinner, whose ex-
istence depends upon its right choices, is forever stalled by its
very own freedom. A choice for the world can never happen
because it may be the wrong choice and, therefore, endanger
the self’s quest back to the creator. Thus, the futility of life is
disclosed. I am alienated from the source of my existence and
in attempting to overcome this through my freedom I am en-
slaved to myself and alienated from the rest of the world. The
human is left alone in a world of “things” that can be used
in an attempt to make right the fragmented relationship with
God.48 “Being-in-Adam” is being that is separated from both
God and world.
Bonhoeffer’s claim is that it is only in Christ that one can be
related to reality (the horizontal) and God (the vertical) at the
same time. In making this assertion Bonhoeffer opens up a new
understanding of freedom. He writes, “God in Christ is free for
man. Because he does not retain his freedom for himself the
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concept of freedom only exists for us as ‘being free for’.”^^ God
freely enters into relationship with his sinful creation and takes
upon himself the fragmentation and disunity that characterizes
the existence of his creatures. It is because God joins together
“in Christ” what human being has split apart “in Adam” that
one can live in both the vertical relationship (creature and
creator) and the horizontal relationship (creature to creature
in community). Bonhoeffer writes,
In a manner which passes all comprehension God reverses the judg-
ment of justice and piety, declares Himself guilty towards the world,
and thereby wipes out the world’s guilt. God himself sets out on the
path of humiliation and atonement, and thereby absolves the world.
God is willing to be guilty of our guilt. He takes upon himself the
punishment and the suffering which this guilt has brought on us.
God Himself answers for godlessness, love for hatred, the saint for
the sinner. Now there is no more godlessness, no more hatred, no
more sin which God has not taken upon Himself, suffered for and
expiated. Now there is no more reality, nor more world, but it is
reconciled with God and at peace. God did this in his dear Son
Jesus Christ. Ecce homo!^^
Through the “glorious exchange” God has entered into a
new unity with the creation. The problem rested in the illusion
of the autonomous subject who believed that it was responsible
for restoring this unity through its freedom. Through the so-
teriological focus Bonhoeffer makes his final move to show the
freedom of the autonomous I to be bondage. The source, not
the alienated creature, is the one who must make the consti-
tutive change at the level of being and give freedom. Because
all human doing lacks the power to mediate the gap between
“being-in-Adam” and “being-in-Christ” it is only God who can
put our “being-in” into a different space. Freedom as my free-
dom leaves me alone and in bondage to myself and my possi-
bilities. It is only by a restored relationship with the “other”
,
both God and the other, that we can be put in the space or
relationship of freedom. This means that freedom-in-Adam
—
the freedom of the noumenal self alone with itself—is simply
an illusion. And, given what has been said about conscience,
this illusive freedom is disclosed in the end as bondage.
Now, “being-in-Christ” means always seeing the world and
God as mediated by the creative redemption of Christ. And
now, because of this, Christian ethics is a reality. Bonhoeffer
writes.
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No man can look with undivided vision at God and at the world
of reality so long as God and the world are torn asunder. Try as
he may, he can only let his eyes wander distractedly from one to
the other. But there is a place at which God and the cosmos are
reconciled, a place at which God and man have become one. That
and that alone is what enables man to set his eyes upon God and
upon the world at the same time. [This place] lies in Jesus Christ,
the Reconciler of the world. . .Whoever sees Jesus Christ does indeed
see God and the world in one. He can henceforward no longer see
God without the world or the world without God.^^
Because through Christ God is always already seen with the
world and the world is seen with God, the purpose of Christian
ethics is “participation in the reality of God and of the world
in Jesus Christ today, and this participation must be such that
I never experience the reality of God without the reality of the
world or the reality of the world without the reality of God.”^^
Human being as “being-in-Christ” is always already an eth-
ical being. This is so because the activity of God in Christ has
re-located us into a space of relationships. We are in relation-
ship with others because we are in relationship with God, the
source, judge and reconciler of our existence. No longer can
Christian theology retreat into a one-sided vertical relation-
ship with the divine. Freedom—as it is given us in Christ—is
always freedom for the “other” . Human being is free “only by
means of the Word of God [i.e., Jesus the Reconciler] .. .Freedom
is not a quality which can be revealed—it is not a possession, a
presence, an object. . .but a relationship and nothing else. . .Being
free means ‘being free for the other’.” Therefore, Christian
existence is existence located in freedom and is therefore re-
lated, ethical existence. Because of this a Christian ethic is
both possible and necessary.
Is it meaningful to speak about existence as ethical at all?
The conclusion is that it is. Ethical reflection understood tem-
porally and theologically is necessary and meaningful because
we are located by God through Christ within a community of
brothers and sisters. Within this community we are made “free
for” each other because in Christ we were made “free from”
ourselves. The illusion of the autonomous human individual
who is alone and self-constituting presents a challenge that
Bonhoeffer’s theological understanding has been able to over-
come. The groundwork has been accomplished and the task of
ethical reflection within the Body of Christ can begin.
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